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I
The gift inter vivos is an ancient device. To the classical Greeks
it often connoted an ingenious way to destroy one's enemies or gain
one's ends. The Hebrews used it with equal shrewdness to circumvent
the strict rules of the law.' Only in our times, however, has it become
an implement for the avoidance of inheritance taxes. The resultant
generosity is sufficient to charm an optimist or to entertain a cynic.
"God hath made men upright but they have sought out many inven-
tions."
Excises upon the privilege of giving have thus become one of the
necessary incidents of a sound tax program. The federal gift tax
laws of 1924 and 1932 were enacted expressly to complement and effec-
tuate the estate tax legislation.2 Estate tax rates being what they are,
the inducement to resort to inter vivos transfers as an avenue of avoid-
ance is cogent indeed. This has been sufficiently illustrated by increas-
ing federal revenue from gift taxes.8 But as the devolution of prop-
erty from generation to generation is thus forced into the channels of
inter vivos transactions, the several states are annually deprived of
prospective revenue under their inheritance tax laws. The perception
of this loss has resulted in the enactment since 1933 of gift tax laws
in six of our states,4 and in the legislative consideration of similar stat-
t A. B., 1925, J. D., 1927, Tulane University; member of the New York Bar;
author, Restraints on Disinheritance (1936) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 139, Estate Corpora-
tions (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 136, and other articles in legal periodicals.
I. The prospective rights of the first-born could be avoided by gift in much the
same manner as those of the surviving spouse under our modern statutes. See 12 JEw-
ISH ENcYCmOPEDIA 523, discussing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Bathra, c. VIII, Mishna
V, VI.
2. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 1o236, 72d Cong., ist
Sess. (1932) I8, 57, 77, 141, 643; 75 CONG. REC. 480 (93); 75 CONG. REC. 7239
(1932) ; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933). So too as to gifts in contempla-
tion of death: Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 (ig3I) ; United States v. Wells,
283 U. S. 102 (193I).
3. Gift tax revenue has increased from $4,0o0,000 for the fiscal year ended June 30,
1933 to $34,0ooooo for that ended June 30, 1938. The receipts for the year ended June
3o, 1936 reached the remarkable total of $i6o,ooo,ooo. TAx SYsTrms OF THE WORLD
(sth ed. 1934) 173; id. (6th ed. 1935) 356; id. (7th ed. 1938) 393; N. Y. Times, July
27, 1938, p. 29, col. 4. Fluctuating revenue from this source is probably attributable to
increase in gifts in anticipation of the effective date of higher rates of tax. These
factors are often disguised by the practice of combining gift tax revenue with that from
estate taxes, thus creating a false impression of uniformity in the annual receipts.
4. Colo. Laws 1937, c. I6i; 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) § 2394-71; N. C.
REv. CODE (Supp. 1937) c. 127, § 6oo; ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 69, i6Ol-28;
amended, Ore. Laws 1937, c. 250; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, x936) Tax Code § 120,
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utes in most of the others.0 The expansion of this movement cannot
but result in jurisdictional problems of prime importance.
The existing state statutes are relatively uniform as to the extent
of jurisdiction claimed. The tax is levied upon gifts of all personal
property of residents and upon all property, whether of residents or non-
residents, which is within the jurisdiction of the state.0 This formula
has two clear implications: first, that the draftsmen of the respective
statutes have assumed for jurisdictional purposes to assimilate gift
taxes to estate taxes; and second, that the theory of jurisdiction is
power over the property which is given, not power over the act of giv-
ing. In the customary words of art, the jurisdiction is predicated upon
the situs of the res.
At first blush the formulation of the state statutes along these
lines appears somewhat anomalous. It is elementary that a gift tax is
an excise, a tax upon the exercise of a specific privilege.7 It would
seem to follow that the tax should be levied where the privilege is exer-
cised.8 The draftsmen of the state statutes have accorded no homage
to this line of reasoning but have rested upon a syllogism of their own.
The syllogism is that, because gift taxes are enacted for the purpose of
safeguarding estate tax revenue, the measures of jurisdiction for the
two types of excise are necessarily coextensive. The validity of this
syllogism will be tested in either of the following predictable eventu-
alities: (i) property having its situs within a state will constitute the
subject matter of a gift beyond the borders of the state, and the donor
will decline to pay the tax levied by his domicile; or (2) other states
will adopt gift tax legislation predicated upon jurisdiction over the gift
as distinguished from jurisdiction over the res. The resolution of these
difficulties, involving as they do complex problems under the I4th
Amendment, will, of course, ultimately rest with the Supreme Court.
In disposing of litigation arising out of state gift tax statutes, the
Court will find itself burdened with a series of collateral considerations.
i-iS, amended, Va. Laws 1936, c. ig; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363, § 4, amended, Wis. Laws
1935, c. 15, § 7; Wis. Laws 1937, cc. 32, 265, 3o2, 3o6-8.
5. 1 Prentice-Hall 1938 Fed. Inher. and Trans. Tax Serv. ff2203.
6. E. g., the Minnesota Act, 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) § 2394-7IC, pro-
vides: "The tax in the case of a person who is a resident of this state at the date of the
transfer shall be on all such transfers if the property transferred has its situs within
this state, and for this purpose intangible property shall be conclusively deemed to have
its situs therein. The tax in the case of a person who is a non-resident of this state at
the date of such transfer shall be on all such transfers if the property transferred has
its situs within this state." The Oregon Act, ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) tit. 69,
§ i6olb, reads: ". . . as to residents of this state, the tax shall apply to the transfer
by gift of any property whatsoever, excepting only property, real or personal, perma-
nently located outside this state; but, in the case of a non-resident, shall apply to a
transfer only if the property is situated within the state of Oregon. .. .
7. Bromley v. McCaughn, 28o U. S. 124 (1929).
8. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 214 (1930).
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The intercalated prohibition of double taxation of estates9 will rise to
haunt it. So too, will its reliance upon the theory of situs, a theory
which has already been ripped and rived in brilliant dissenting opin-
ions 10 and commentaries. 1
Some consideration will subsequently be given to the probable life
expectancy of the line of cases on double taxation beginning with Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia.12 At this point the unimpaired con-
tinuance of their authority is hypothetically assumed. However, as
was shrewdly suggested by one of the series of dissents in this line of
cases, merely forbidding double taxation does not solve all problems.'"
The Court may simply have cut off one of the heads of the hydra. It
may have taken a path to which it cannot adhere without an ever increas-
ing usurpation of power over the states. The state gift tax litigation
will surely force this dilemma upon the Court. Drafting of the state
statutes in blind acceptance of the doctrine of situs has only served to
intensify the difficulties which the former Supreme Court majority
have created.
Swallowing all these considerations whole, we shall assume that
double taxation is repugnant to the I4th Amendment and that only a
single state may tax a gift inter vivos. In order to complete this as-
sumption, we must add to it at least two more suppositions: first, that a
second state will have no right to bring about double taxation by en-
acting an excise upon the right to receive the gift; and second, that the
gift itself must in all instances be regarded as an indivisible economic
integer though on its face the practical benefits of the transfer pass
partly within one state and partly within another.14 Begging these
questions for the time being, and bowing to the prohibition of double
taxation, we move to the next problem: Which is the single state having
jurisdiction to tax the gift?
II
There is an old saying to the effect that words are the daughters
of men, but that things are the sons of God. Genesis tells us that the
9. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1930) ; Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204 (193o); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586
(193o) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. i (193o) ; First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
IO. Ibid. Some of Holmes' most famous phrases and aphorisms were inspired by
this controversy. Perhaps he was keenest when he said: "I cannot believe that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic
or moral beliefs in its prohibitions." Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930).
II. Among the most forceful are Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of Constitutional
Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 628; and Stimson, Jurisdiction to Tax In-
tangibles (1937) 23 CORN. L. Q. 142. See (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 404, 405.
12. 280 U. S. 83 (930).
13. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 334 (1932).
14. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 28o U. S. 83, 95 (1930).
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proper union of the two may result in giants and heroes of truth.15 But
there are words whose reference-power to things is vague, indirect and
remote. "Jurisdiction" is such a word. Little of value can be added
to the mass of recent writings on the meaning of jurisdiction to taz.
A few comments may help to tidy up the prevailing theories and per-
haps to tighten the nexus between abstraction and reality.
At the risk of immediate association with the school of Hobbes, 16
we can safely postulate that jurisdiction is essentially power. How far-
reaching the tentacles of that power can become has been demonstrated
by the fantastic tax laws of certain European countries.17 Jurisdiction
can operate like a whirling cone, one moving point of economic control
sufficing to bear the entire burden of tax imposition.
This is not to contradict the protection theory of jurisdiction which
Mr. Justice Stone treats as the obverse side of the coin.', Taxes are
paid because benefits are received. Contributions to the cost of gov-
ernment are exacted from those who obtain the benefit of government.
Mr. Justice Holmes rightly points out that taxes are essentially levies
upon persons for that purpose, and that the measurement of taxes by
property or by the income from property is only a convenient means
of ascertaining the ultimate incidence of the cost of protection.'9 The
consensual element in taxation is so important that no effective system
would be possible without it. Even under a dictatorship, government
cannot live by dread alone but must derive its support from some popu-
lar sense of quid pro quo. Self-assessment in income taxation rests
only in part upon the fear of being caught. At least in the sense that
taxes are regarded as a necessary element of civilized life, people may
be said to pay them because they actually want to. This element in the
operation of tax jurisdiction must be considered later in relation to the
operations of our federal system.
We are a due-process-clause-minded people. We are unable to
worship the State or to believe that the acts of sovereignty are ipso facto
right. If the exercise of admitted power seems unfair and unreasonable,
we are unlikely to exercise it. For that reason considerations of due
process have worked their way into our conceptions of federal tax
jurisdiction.20 How long these considerations will remain in opera-
15. GENESIS, 6, i-iv.
x6. See HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (933) c. 3.
17. Wurzel, Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation (938) 38 COL. L.
REv. 8o9.
I8. See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 597 (193o) ; First Nat. Bank of Bos-
ton v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 333 (1932) ; Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 434 (1935) ;
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 3oo U. S. 308, 313 (937) ; First Bank Stock Corp.
v. Minnesota, 3oi U. S. 234, 241 (937).
ig. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 28o U. S. 83 (1929).
20. See Wurzel, supra note 17, at 822.
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tion depends upon such elements as our future needs for revenue, our
relations to other nations and our general attitude toward income and
wealth. The residuum of power is yet untapped.
The several states too are sovereigns, but sovereigns forming part
of a federal system. 21 Just how far the federal system requires pro-
hibition of double or multiple taxation is a question which we shall
explore hereinafter. At this point we think of these forty-eight sov-
ereignties as though they were forty-eight mutually exclusive baskets.
If destiny tosses out a taxable event, that event must fall into a single
one of the baskets. The fact that it has fallen into one basket is of
itself sufficient to prevent any overflow into the next basket.
When the Supreme Court came to pass upon jurisdiction over
intangibles for estate tax purposes, the majority relied upon the con-
ception of situs. Situs played the Hercules to jurisdiction's Antaeus.
It kept jurisdiction up in the air and away from mother earth long
enough to strangle it. The jurisdiction to levy an estate tax was lim-
ited to the situs of the property passing from the dead to the living.
If these principles are to be applied with any intelligence to the
new problems of gift taxes, they must first be understood. An estate
tax, the Court has always insisted, is an excise upon the privilege of
passing or receiving property upon death.22 When the Supreme Court
handed down the series of double taxation decisions, 23 a number of
commentators drew the natural inference that estate taxes had been
assimilated to property taxes ;24 and it has recently been suggested that
that assimilation will extend to gift taxes.23  If we concede that an es-
tate or gift tax is a type of property tax (a tax upon one of the elements
of owning property),26 then jurisdiction over the property is fairly
equivalent to jurisdiction over the devolution or the gift.
Unfortunately this conclusion violates not only the Court's insist-
ence that estate and gift taxes are not property taxes; it also flies in
the face of several established doctrines which .can hardly be reconciled
with the proposed assimilation. One of these doctrines is that estate
and gift taxes may constitutionally be imposed upon securities of the
United States and of the several states.2 7  In view of the various ex-
21. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933).
22. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (igoo) ; Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525
(1912) ; First Nat Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932) ; Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (935).
23. See mupra note 9.
24. HARDING, loc. cit. supra note 16; Note (1930) 4o YALE L. J. 99; (1937) 5I
HARv. L. REv. 174.
25. Note (1938) 5I HARv. L. REv. 533, 541 et seq.; see Opinion of Attorney Gen-
eral of Oregon, April 30, 1936.
26. Cf. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (1929).
27. The history of these distinctions, "worth a volume of logic", is exhaustively
presented in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (900). See also New York Trust Co.
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press and implied constitutional inhibitions upon property taxes which
are inapplicable to excise taxes, it is hard to find any justification for
regarding them as governed by similar limitations. To say that a spe-
cific levy is an excise tax and in the same breath to determine its jurisdic-
tion in terms of property taxation, is essentially to delete and expunge
distinctions which have become fundamental in our system of govern-
ment.
A resident of the State of New York takes certain shares of stock
and gives them to his son in the State of New Jersey. If the shares of
stock had already obtained a business or trust situs in New Jersey, it is
fair to assume that only that state could levy an excise tax upon the
gift.28 If, however, no localized situs had been obtained, the Supreme
Court would say that up to the time of the gift the situs of the shares
was in New York; and if assimilation to estate tax cases is to be its
rule, then New York may tax the gift. But in such event in order to
deny jurisdiction to New Jersey, the Supreme Court must hold that
New Jersey has no taxing power over a transfer which takes place
within its borders, the validity of which, including the capacity of donor
and donee and the formalities incident to the gift, is determined by its
laws. 29 Of course, it can thus be caught in the tangled web it has woven
for itself, but it is bound to be conscious of some sense of logical ab-
surdity. It is bound to have difficulty with the thought that it is deny-
ing jurisdiction to tax the exercise of a privilege in the very state in
which the privilege is exercised.
Perhaps this dilemma can be avoided by resorting to history
where common sense seems to have failed. The word "gift" in early
English law was the broadest term descriptive of any conveyance of
title and included all sorts of transfers, sales, exchanges, gages and
leases. 0 It was a broader term than "feoffment". A gift in our sense
was regarded as only one type of conveyance inter vivos, and at least
in early Norman times a nominal consideration was customary. At one
stage in the law the baby child of the donor or vendor, as expectant
heir, was brought upon the land and given a penny or toy. Historically,
therefore, a gift bears much closer affinity to a sale than to devolution
by death. It is only the use of gifts to avoid inheritance taxation that
has obfuscated that genetic classification. The Court may thus be
enabled to save the structure of the double taxation rules by assimilating
v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (192) ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 3oi U. S.
495 (937) ; (1937) 5o HARv. L. REv. 840.
28. Matter of Brown, 274 N. Y. 1o, 8 N. E. (2d) 42 (937), cert. denied, 302 U. S.
731 (937).
29. 2 BEALE, Co nmc OF LAWS (935) 980, 984, 1253, 1255; THORNTON, GIFrS
AND ADVANCEMENTS (893).
30. 2 PoLLOCK & MAITLAND, HiSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1895) 12, 82, 211.
396 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
gifts to sales and, by like token, assimilating gift taxes to sales taxes.
Gift taxes have already been the subject of judicial analogy to stamp
taxes upon the transfer of securities and to taxes upon sales of grain
upon an exchange.31 That analogy may be extended to place gifts in
the category of taxable inter vivos transfers, and thus to make the place
of the gift the proper jurisdiction for taxing it. On its face this sugges-
tion has the merit of simplicity and historical support.
But taxation (as has been often said by those on both sides of every
jurisdictional controversy) is an intensely practical matter. So far as
sales are concerned, there is relatively little opportunity for choice of
jurisdiction. In the ordinary course of business, sales taxes are col-
lected because it is not easy or cheap to order the transaction so as to
avoid the jurisdiction. If the rates of sales taxes were sufficiently
increased, a law of diminishing returns would undoubtedly become
operative. Under existing rates it is rarely profitable to lay the juris-
dictional basis for evasion. These considerations are inapplicable to
gifts. The Court will not fail to recognize that, by assimilating gift
tax jurisdiction to sales tax jurisdiction, it may extend an invitation to
ready evasion.8 2 It is so easy where a substantial gift is involved to
cross the state line.
The solution of this problem may arise in a peculiarly accidental
manner. The United States Treasury has been advocating the adoption
of an integrated system of gift and estate taxes, and it is probable that
one element of that system will be the granting of a credit against the
federal transfer tax for gift taxes paid to the several states. 3 If such
a credit is granted, the difficulty will be largely removed, for then the
donor must pay to the Federal Government whatever he evades paying
to the state. In such eventuality the Court will be able as a practical
matter to assimilate gift taxes to sales taxes without inviting evasion
and without disturbing the rules against double taxation. It is sub-
mitted that such assimilation would be a far happier result than the
manifold inconsistencies arising out of assimilation to estate taxes. It
would eliminate the much mangled fiction of situs and would determine
jurisdiction on a strictly realistic basis. Jurisdiction would be found
in that state where all the powers of sovereignty are applied to the act
of giving.
We might add that a decision of the Court in accordance with
these principles would almost inevitably induce the enactment of a
31. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (I2g).
32. Cf. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935).
33. FACING THE TAX PROBLEM (2oth Cent. Fund, Inc. 1937) 433; N. Y. Times,
Aug. 21, 1938, § I, p. i, col. 7; Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Tax
Revision, Subcommittee Recommendations, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938) 55-59.
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federal credit for state gift taxes if one had not already been granted
by Congress.
One further comment is necessary as to the operation of the double
taxation cases. When these decisions were first handed down, it was
argued that they favored the creditor states in which the owners of
securities resided as distinguished from the poorer states in which cap-
ital investments have their fruits.34 The domiciliary state was per-
mitted to levy a tax while the state whose natural resources were
employed in building up- the underlying wealth was not. Various
answers have been given to this argument, but its weakness is most
manifest in regard to shares of stock. It is thoroughly unrealistic to
assume that the state of corporate operation is usually the state of
incorporation. A resident of New York, who dies owning stock in a
corporation which derives its income from Texas sulphur, will usually
die possessed of stock in a Delaware company. The state of incorpo-
ration furnishes certain local conveniences to this economic arrange-
ment, but is not the scene of creation of natural wealth. Moreover,
compensation for the use of local resources should in all fairness be
sought from the corporation employing them as distinguished from the
stockholder. It is sufficient that the stockholder's capital investment
and income are subject to the assessments which the corporation must
pay. No new economic benefit is conferred by the state of corporate
operation when shares of stock pass from one absentee owner to
another.
We have pointed out here a technique by which the Supreme Court
may avoid the difficulties attendant upon assimilating gift tax jurisdic-
tion to estate tax jurisdiction, to wit: by regarding a gift as a type of
gratuitous sale. If the Court does not accept this or some other escape
of its own invention, it must choose either to arrogate a further power
over the several states, or to reconsider the entire line of cases begin-
ning with Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia. In the third section
hereof we shall attempt to anticipate that reconsideration.
III
Our Supreme Court being the perpetual constitutional convention
that it is, decisions with all the force of gospel must often pass into the
limbo of forgotten things. Snatched out of Hornbook and Restatement
by the slow lingering disease of "distinguished", or the sudden casualty
of "overruled", they eventually find their way to the judicial obituary
34. Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 305;
Notes (i93o) 43 HARv. L. REV. 792, (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 99.
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page. The difficulty is, as Mr. Justice Holmes somewhat plaintively
remarked, that "we need an authoritative list". 5
Frick v. Pennsylvania 8 6 was handed down in June, 1925. At that
time the unanimous Court was quite sanguine as to the jurisdiction of
states of incorporation to levy estate taxes:
"As those States had created the corporations issuing the
stocks, they had power to impose the tax and to enforce it by such
means, irrespective of the decedent's domicile and the actual situs
of the stock certificates. Pennsylvania's jurisdiction over the
stocks necessarily was subordinate to that power. Therefore, to
bring them into the administration in that State it was essential
that the tax be paid." 87
The process of judicially annihilating these principles was as brief
as it was unexpected. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia was the
first blow in November, 1929. The patient was interred by First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine 8 in January, 193:. Within six
years after Frick v. Pennsylvania, the i 4th Amendment had been found
to be pregnant with a rule against double taxation undiscovered in the
previous sixty years since its adoption. The dissents of liberals on the
bench were brilliant, vehement and entirely unheeded. The logic of the
majority in dealing with the question of double taxation was somewhat
reminiscent of Alexander's: If you cannot unravel the Gordian knot,
then raise your sword and cut it. Briefly stated, it ran as follows:
Each specific article of property has its own situs, the situs of intangi-
bles being presumptively at the domicile of their owner. When the
owner dies, the devolution of his property takes place in only one state,
to wit: the state of the situs. Ergo, only that state may impose an
inheritance tax upon such devolution. In the case of tangible property,
the transmission of the thing from the dead to the living in more than
one state is "a physical impossibility". In the case of intangibles it is
a "logical self-contradiction". 39 These principles have been accepted in
accordance with the well-known maxim: "What I tell you three times
is true."
Now the point at which the question was begged was obviously the
attribution of a specific situs to each article of property. The conclusion
35. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 596 (193o).
36. 268 U. S. 473 (I925).
37. Id. at 497.
38. 284 U. S. 312 (932).
39. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 3X2, 326 (1932). The
Court majority, uncertain of the possible extent of multiple taxation, was obviously im-
pelled by its dread of the unknown-much like geographers who, Plutarch remarked,
"crowd into the edges of their maps parts of the world which they do not know about,
adding notes in the margin to the effect that beyond this lies nothing but sandy deserts
full of wild beasts, and unapproachable bogs".
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of single taxation is implicit in that assumption. The minority of the
Court kept insisting that situs was a mere fiction and that the resolution
of the question of constitutional power did not require the interposition
of any such "phantasm". 40  If state jurisdiction to impose inheritance
taxes is to be determined by the existence vel non of some reasonable
relation between the power and protection of the state on the one hand,
and the article of property on the other hand, the fiction of situs could
serve only to obscure the existence of any such relation-something like
a billboard between the Court and the landscape. The relation had to
be reasonable because the states were part of a federal system, but a
reasonable relation could be found to exist in more than one state if the
decedent's activities had brought his capital beyond the borders of a
single jurisdiction. Of course, when the majority went on to argue
that "death duties rest upon the power of the State imposing them to
control the privilege of succession",41 it ignored its own contradiction of
that doctrine in Knowlton v. Moore.42  There would be no federal
estate tax if the right to regulate the privilege of succession were the
exclusive gravamen of death duties.
Then came the practical considerations which swayed the majority.
To tax intangibles in more than one state was unjust, inconvenient and
impractical. Friction might arise among the various states, and the
purposes of the constitutional compact thus be frustrated. These con-
siderations were found to be "greatly fortified by the fact that a large
majority of the states have adopted that rule by their reciprocal inher-
itance tax statutes". 43 Interestingly enough, the minority insisted that
the adoption of the reciprocal statutes proved just the contrary. Ap-
proximately three-fourths of the states had passed reciprocal exemption
statutes by 193o although there were only four such statutes in effect
as late as 1925. 44 Where then was the great danger of friction among
the several states? By the time that double taxation of corporate stock
was forbidden in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, the problem
had become largely academic. The circumscription of the constitutional
powers of the states seemed therefore all the more gratuitous.
The change in the complexion of the Court since 1932 has not as
yet cancelled the authority of the double taxation cases. However,
some storm signals have been hoisted.
As recently as Senior v. Braden,45 the Court denied to the State of
Ohio the power to levy a tax measured by the income from beneficial
40. Id. at 331. See Stimson, supra note ii.
41. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 329 (1932).
42. 178 U. S. 41, 59 (goo).
43. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 331 (932) ; see Farm-
er's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 209 (930), 30 COL. L. REV. 404.
44. See Note (930) 40 YALE L. J. 99, 102.
45. 295 U. S. 422 (1935).
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interests evidenced by transferable certificates entitling the holder to
certain portions of the rents from specified parcels of land, including
land both within and without that state. The trust certificate was dis-
regarded and the tax viewed as an imposition upon foreign real estate.
Only Justices Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo dissented. Expressing their
aversion to the "newly discovered efficacy" 46 of the i4 th Amendment
to forbid double taxation, they insisted that the trust certificates within
the State of Ohio were a separate legal and economic interest, not to be
regarded as identical with the land, and that the protection afforded by
that state to the certificates was a sufficient basis for the validity of
the tax.
Two years later Mr. Justice Stone was writing the majority
opinion in New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,47 holding that a state may
constitutionally tax a resident upon income received from rents of land
located without the state and from interest on bonds physically without
the state and secured by mortgages upon land similarly situated. He
was able to find as between the different taxes imposed by the different
states "distinct and separable taxable interests".
48
Subsequently when he came to write the opinion in First Bank
Stock Corporation v. Minnesota,49 his distaste for the rule against
double taxation appeared explicitly. He insisted upon leaving open the
question whether taxation of shares of stock at the business situs would
preclude their taxation elsewhere. The mine has been set under the
double taxation cases and may soon be ready to explode. If property
is protected within two jurisdictions, it may find itself subject to contri-
bution toward the cost of government in each. Maxwell v. Bugbee 50
meanwhile lurks suspiciously in the background, reinforced by the
Louisiana chain store tax decision.51
No flat position has yet been taken. The Cohn case clearly rests
upon the distinction between the two types of tax and the two types of
beneficial interest involved. This leaves an exceedingly thin line of
demarcation between licit and unconstitutional levies. If ingenuity can
discover a plausible distinction, however fine, the resultant taxation will
not be stigmatized as double. Eventually, however, the entire territory
outlined in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine may thus be par-
titioned away. Perhaps this is a convenient method of reversal through
erosion. The majority of the Court, following Mr. Justice Stone and
46. Id. at 434.
47. 3oo U. S. 308 (i937).
48. Id. at 314.
49. 301 U. S. 234 (937).
50. 250 U. S. 525 (1919); Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax
(1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 756.
51. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937).
STATE GIFT TAX JURISDICTION
Mr. Justice Brandeis, seem to look with disfavor upon the "newly dis-
covered efficacy" of the I4th Amendment.
52
If, on the other hand, the double taxation cases are still good law,
then in the light of these recent decisions it will become increasingly
difficult to maintain any analogy between estate taxation and property
taxation. Such analogy is on principle untenable and in all probability
estate taxation will be consistently' viewed as the excise which it is.
That much at least is fairly predictable.
A lawyer once said to Samuel Johnson: "You, Sir, are a philos-
opher. I too have often tried to become a philosopher, but somehow
cheerfulness was always breaking in." In the case of the Supreme
Court, the thing that is "always breaking in" is the necessity of applying
established principles to novel situations. It has hypostasized the con-
ception of situs and has invested a word with the flesh and blood of
objective reality. But how will that figment of judicial ingenuity bear
up when state gift tax cases come before the Court? If situs is to
prevail as the criterion of gift tax jurisdiction, conclusions far more
offensive than those involving estate taxes must be swallowed. Much
has been done to whittle away the accepted constitutional powers of
the states. As to gift taxes, the Court will have to use an axe. If it
insists upon the analogy to estate taxes, it will be confronted with its
own proposition that the power to regulate the succession is the grava-
men of death duties. Then who can deny that the jurisdiction in which
the gift takes place has power to regulate the gift? For if that power
be subject to controls and qualifications, it is nonetheless primary, direct
and territorial.
Under these circumstances it is not improbable that state gift tax
legislation may reopen the entire question of double taxation. If the
principles enunciated in Frick v. Pennsylvania could, like Polonius,
be so unseemingly interred, an exhumation and inquest into the
cause of their death may yet be undertaken. These principles were once
said to have "ceased to have other than historic interest".53 But gen-
eralizations of this sort invite contest. What was so long accepted
(without any discernible disruption of the federal union) cannot be
summarily consigned to oblivion.
52. At the last term of the Court, no important new light was thrown on the sub-
ject. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U. S. 506 (1938), shows no hesitation
to validate state taxes upon non-resident shareholders. Connecticut General Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77 (1938), confines the state's jurisdiction "by reference to
the incidence of the tax upon its objects rather than the ultimate thrust of the economic
benefits and burdens of transactions within the state". Control over the objects of the
tax is a fair pragmatic criterion. The trend continues at the present term. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Virginia, 59 Sup. Ct. 1 (1938).
53. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 322 (1932).
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If these propositions are reexamined, it is to be hoped that the
approach will be boldly realistic. The power and correlative protection
implied in the term "jurisdiction" should be interpreted in terms of
simple economic phenomena. Whether a state proffers sufficient pro-
tection to a specific res simply because its laws or the machinery of its
courts may be invoked to realize upon the res, is a highly debatable
question.54 If there is to be a retreat from the inhibition of multiple
taxation, that retreat should not be converted into a rout.
The Court has at hand a convenient formula as to gift taxes: the
analogue of local excises on sales. It must, in any case, undertake to
plot the complex graph of jurisdiction, power and federalization. Its
success will depend upon the selection of variable coordinates, functions
of a shifting economy. If the present graph seems incoherent and dis-
jointed, that is only because the mathematician has been lured by "nice
sharp quillets of the law" to a belief in constants. Judges must not fear
the impact of change, for much comfort may be found in the use of old
names.
54. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (,937).
